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Historically, trade and economic relations among the European Com-
munity ("EC")' and the Eastern European members of the Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA")2 have been weak. In recent
years, however, the EC has shown a desire to improve its ties to the East.
There are several reasons why the EC may benefit from closer relations
with its Eastern European counterpart. The EC believes that closer rela-
tions may produce "[e]conomic interdependence in Europe, generated by
more joint ventures, licensing agreements, easier arrangements for recip-
rocal investment and, above all, a narrowing of the technology gap,
[which] can lead to a more permanent stabilization of detente and peace
between East and West within Europe."3
The relationship between the EC and Hungary is illustrative of this
change in policy by the EC, as well as a growing receptive attitude to-
ward economic relations on the part of the Eastern Europeans. This Ar-
ticle will examine the dynamics of the relationship between Hungary and
the EC, as well as the basic negotiating positions of the EC and the
CMEA. In addition, this Article will explore the special characteristics
unique to Hungary which make it especially attractive to the EC as a
* Resident Partner, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Georgetown Univer-
sity, 1971; B.A., University of Colorado, 1968.
1 The European Community ("EC") is comprised of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain,
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Portugal. THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ONE PARLIAMENT FOR TWELVE 6-7 (1988). The EC is composed of
three separate legal entities: the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC"); the European
Economic Community ("EEC" or "Common Market"); and the European Atomic Energy Commu-
nity ("Euratom"). Id. at 7.
2 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA") is the official name. It is also referred
to as COMECON. There are 10 members in the CMEA: The USSR, German Democratic Republic,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Cuba and Viet Nam. See, eg.,
Memo "Relations Between the Community and the Member Countries of COMECON (1)," May,
1988 (on file at the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Memo].
3 1986-1987 EUR. PARL. Doc. (EER No. A-2-187/86) 32 (1986) [hereinafter WORKING Doc.].
Cf. "The EC and Eastern Europe: Economic and Trade Relations," speech by Mr. Willy De Clercq,
EC Commissioner for External Relations, in Copenhagen, Denmark (July 17, 1987) [hereinafter
Speech]. "In aiming at a normalisation of relations ... we want to see an end, once and for all, to
the Soviet Union's guerilla warfare against the Community in international organisations. We also
want to see it dealing with the Community as a Community, instead of trying to pick off our member
states one by one in pursuance of some divide-and-rule policy." Id. at 8.
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negotiating partner. Finally, this Article will describe the recent negotia-
tions between Hungary and the EC which led to the signing of a bilateral
trade agreement in June of 1988, and will conclude with an examination
of whether the EC-Hungary negotiations may serve as a model for simi-
lar agreements in the future.
I. THE EC AND THE CMEA: DEVELOPMENT OF A RELATIONSHIP
The EC was created in the aftermath of the Second World War' by
a group of twelve states which agreed to forego a portion of their sover-
eignty to work for the benefit of mutual economic advantage.' As was
expected, the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR") viewed
the creation of an economic coalition of free European states with suspi-
cion and hostility.6 In fact, the USSR continued to view the EC as a
temporary phenomenon until the early 1970s;7 therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that the relationship between the EC and CMEA has developed quite
slowly.
Negotiations between the EC and the CMEA had been pursued for
several years with little progress, and were broken off by mutual consent
in 1980.8 The disagreement at that point was the CMEA's insistence on
the inclusion of trade provisions and the establishment of a joint commit-
tee for the supervision of relations with CMEA members.9 This was un-
acceptable to the EC because the CMEA has neither a common
commercial policy nor a common commercial policy instrument.1 °
The underlying reason for the suspension of talks was the realization
that the EC and the CMEA had diametrically opposing views on the
proper approach to trade matters. CMEA's proposal provided for trade
negotiations on a "bloc-to-bloc" basis."' This proposal entailed the con-
ducting of negotiations between the EC and the CMEA as a unit, and not
bilateral relations, which are negotiations with the individual member
states of either organization. The EC favored bilateral trade relations
with each of the Eastern European countries. 2 The EC's preference for
4 See generally OFFICE FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
STEPS TO EUROPEAN UNITY, COMMUNITY PROGRESS TO DATE: A CHRONOLOGY (1983).
5 THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 1, at 7.
6 In reviewing the historical relationship between the EC and Eastern Europe, Mr. De Clercq
said, "We were accused of being a capitalist - imperialist creation, of working in the interests of the
multinational monopolies and against the interests of the working class. We were also seen as the
economic arm of NATO, and indeed as a kind of European subsidiary of America Inc." Speech,
supra note 3, at 2.
7 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 12.
8 Speech, supra note 3, at 5; See also Memo, supra note 2, at 1.
9 Memo, supra note 2, at 1.
10 Id.




bilateral trade relations was motivated by a desire to curtail the influence
of the USSR-within the CMEA. 3 Proceeding on a bloc-to-bloc basis was
also unacceptable to the EC because the CMEA did not possess a com-
mon commercial policy. 4 By proceeding on a bilateral basis, agreements
could take into account the major differences among the Eastern Bloc
economies. 1
5
Although official relations between the CMEA and the EC only re-
cently materialized, informal economic contacts between the EC and
member states of the CMEA have existed for some time. 16 For example,
the EC and member states of the CMEA had previously concluded five
textile agreements, 17 as well as voluntary restraint arrangements on steel
exports"8 and agricultural products. The EC has not only sought to en-
hance such bilateral economic relations but made this objective a
priority. 19
The possibility of negotiations was reignited at the CMEA summit
in June 1984, when the CMEA expressed a desire to establish relations
with economic organizations of developed capitalist countries.20  The
CMEA also expressed a willingness to concede on the issue which had
brought an end to the negotiations in 1980. The CMEA would allow
bilateral trade and economic relations between the member countries of
the organizations rather than by a bloc-to-bloc agreement.2 '
Mr. Sychov, the Secretary of CMEA, proposed relations be estab-
lished by a joint declaration;22 the EC accepted this approach.23 How-
ever, the EC emphasized its intention to proceed with building bilateral
relations with the individual European member countries of the
CMEA.2 4 The EC's policy at this point was "normalization" of rela-
tions.2" It wanted to discuss problems, negotiate agreements and have
13 Id.
14 Memo, supra note 2, at 1; Speech, supra note 3, at 4; WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 13.
15 Trevelyan, Moscow, East Berlin Ask for EC Ties, Ending 30-year Freeze, Reuter Bus. Rep.,
June 10, 1988.
16 Memo, supra note 2, at 1; WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 15.
17 Memo, supra note 2, at 1. The countries with whom the EC had the agreements are Bulga-
ria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Id.
18 Id. The countries involved were, again, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and
Romania. Id.
19 Id. at 2; WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 15.
20 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 14.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 15; Speech, supra note 3, at 5; Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
23 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 15; Speech, supra note 3, at 5; Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
Possible areas for EC-CMEA cooperation included economic forecasts, statistics, norms and stan-
dards, and environmental protection. WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 18.
24 Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
25 Normalization, according to the EC, is "willingness to negotiate an overall trade agreement
with each country, the accreditation of diplomatic missions with the Community and the abandon-
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formal relations with CMEA countries through missions to the Commu-
nity, as well as encourage normal EC participation in international orga-
nizations and conventions.26
This normalization was to be achieved through "parallelism.1
27
The EC would pursue official relations with the CMEA while at the same
time, in parallel, strive to normalize relations with each CMEA member
country.28 Also, the EC invoked a policy of "differentiation," whereby
each CMEA country would "be dealt with in accordance with its own
characteristics and situation. 2
9
In January 1986, Willy De Clercq, the External Relations Commis-
sioner for the EC, sent letters to the member states of the CMEA expres-
sing the EC's desire to normalize relations and negotiate bilateral
agreements. 30  Every European CMEA state expressed interest in im-
proving its economic relations with the EC.31 Because the EC's trade
with the Eastern European countries had increased,32 further trade rela-
tions were of heightened importance.
Although the initial conflict over the approach concerning trade and
economic relations was resolved, another problem became apparent. The
CMEA was unwilling to recognize West Berlin as a territory within the
EC.33 Ultimately, a compromise was reached. The city was not explic-
itly mentioned, but a clause provided for "reaffirmation of the 1971 con-
vention of the World War Two victorious powers.",
34
In June 1988, an agreement establishing formal relations was signed
ment of anti-Community disruptive action in international organizations." WORKING Doc., supra
note 3, at 15.
26 D. F. Williamson, Secretaire General, COMEUR, Telex hebdomadaire No. 345, June 20,
1988, at 14. (on file at the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law).
27 The Commission defined "parallelism" as "development and normalization of relations with
Comecon and at the same time with the member countries of Comecon, priority being given to the
latter aspect." Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
28 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 15. See also Telex hebdomadaire, supra note 26, at 14.
29 Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
30 Memo, supra note 2, at 2; WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 15.
31 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 21. The countries which developed further contacts with
the EC are Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic
Republic. Id.; Memo, supra note 2, at 2; see also EEC/COMECON: Mr. Sychov Wants Talks
Quickly; Initial Conversations With East Germany, Agence Internationale d'Information Pour La
Presse, Nov. 15, 1986 (initial directives with Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and East
Germany).
32 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 22. Trade with Eastern Europe was 5.3% of the EC's
foreign trade in 1960. The amount increased in 1975 to 8.3%, and was 7.7% in 1984. Thus, EC's
trade with Eastern European countries falls between their trade with the African-Caribbean and
Pacific Island states (5.6%) and the other European states (27.5%). Id.




by the EC and CMEA"
II. FACTORS FAVORING HUNGARAN-EC BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS
In 1986, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, replying to the letter from
De Clercq,36 indicated his willingness to start bilateral talks." The nego-
tiations between the EC and Hungary were not to be contingent upon the
overall success of the talks between the EC and the CMEA.38
In expressing its willingness to negotiate, the EC recognized the spe-
cial characteristics of Hungary as compared to other state-trading coun-
tries,39 and determined factors relevant to negotiations. One such factor
was Hungary's movement toward economic reform. Seeking to eliminate
central economic planning through the "New Economic Mechanism,"''
Hungary sought to put in place, "largely free price formation, the fixing
of wages and salaries in accordance with the profitability of undertak-
ings, worker participation in undertakings, decisions on production
programmes and investment priorities and certain autonomy for compa-
nies whilst at the same time restricting the State's influence to the general
economic regulators (taxation, credit, etc.)."41 Social and political fac-
tors such as the freedom of movement in Hungary,42 the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") Cultural Forum,4 3 and
the new electoral law' also affected the relationship. Three other factors
also distinguished Hungary from other CMEA states, and made initia-
tion of bilateral negotiations easier: Membership in the General Agree-
35 310. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 157) 35 (1988). An immediate effect will be the establishment
of embassies in the respective countries; the EC will establish an embassy in Moscow and the
COMECON will establish an embassy in Brussels. European Parliament Leader Cites "Historic"
Agreement, Associated Press, May 25, 1988. Id.
36 Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
37 Written question No. 906/86, by Mr. Willy Vernimmen, Answer by Mr. De Clercq on be-
half of the Commission, Sept. 12, 1986 (on file at the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law).
38 Id.
39 Resolution on possible trade relations between the European Community and Hungary, 14
0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 176) 192 (1986) [hereinafter Resolution]. The Resolution suggests the
special characteristics of Hungary may negate the setting of a precedent with other CMEA mem-
bers. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
40 Id. at 192.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 193. The forum was held in Budapest in 1985. It offered Western visitors opportuni-
ties to participate in official talks with Hungarian politicians and a privately organized symposium in
which many opposition writers, intellectuals and others freely discussed human rights issues. Id.
44 Id. Introduced in 1985, the electoral law is designed to establish a socialist democracy. The
system allows, for the first time in a COMECON country, election meetings to nominate as many as
four candidates for each constituency. Id.
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ment on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), 45 the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF")46 and the World Bank.
A. Hungarian GATT Membership
Hungary's membership in the GATT was an important considera-
tion for the EC.4 7 The non-market economy of a CMEA state is incon-
sistent with the free market philosophy upon which the GATT is
based." When a CMEA member is allowed accession into the GATT,4 9
concessions are often demanded since a planned economy inherently vio-
lates the GATT's ban on quantitative import restrictions.5 ° Quantitative
import restrictions are limitations on imports expressed in quantitative
measures, and are expressly disallowed by the GATT.5 Because all im-
port decisions in a planned economy are made by the state,5 2 such deci-
sions inherently set quantitative import quotas.
Quantitative import quotas are also counter to most-favored nation
("MFN") status. A fundamental concept of the GATT, MFN status
dictates that members may not discriminate against other members by
means of tariff rates.53 But again, because tariff rates are essentially
meaningless in a planned economy (where the importer paying the duty
is also the recipient of the revenues), the state is able to discriminate
freely among countries simply through its import decisions.
Hungary received enough support from the GATT members to join
45 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
46 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. 1501; amended 90 Stat. 2660, T.I.A.S. 8937 [hereinafter IMF].
47 Resolution, supra note 39, at 193; WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 24.
48 J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1174-75 (2d ed. 1986).
In a nonmarket economy, goods and resources are allocated by the government, whereas in a free-
market economy, prices freely set in a market govern supply and demand. Id. The inconsistency
arises since many of the GATT rules restrict the types of regulations which governments can impose
on international trades but do not aim at regulating the traders themselves. Id. at 1179.
49 Article XXXIII of the GATT allows accession of a new contracting party ("CP") with a
two-thirds majority vote. GATT, supra note 45, art. XXXIII. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra
note 48, at 320-22.
50 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 23-24.
51 Article XI, entitled "General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions" provides that "no
prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained" on the impor-
tation or exportation of any product. GATT supra note 45, art. XI.
52 See generally J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 48, at 1174.
53 Id. Most-favored nation status, in short, is nondiscrimination against trading partners. Id.
The concept is articulated in article 1 of the GATT. See K. DAM, THE GATr: LAW AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 18 (1970).
Vol. 21:55
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the GATT. 4 Accession brings to the contracting party ("CP") numer-
ous benefits, including a large number of tariff concessions."5 It does not,
however, automatically guarantee such benefits will apply between a CP
and all GATT members. Each existing CP has the right to refuse to
apply the GATT to the new contracting country. 6 The EC agreed to
Hungary's accession to the GATT, but did not want Hungary to reap
full GATT article I benefits.5 7 In particular, the EC wanted to maintain
quantitative import restraints on Hungarian goods as a safeguard to as-
sure that member states were also benefited by Hungary's accession to
the GATT. 58
Hungary initially agreed to negotiate with the EC, but insisted its
accession provide it with the full benefits of the GATT with respect to
existing CPs. 9 During subsequent negotiations, and in the face of
steadfast EC resolve on this point, Hungary abandoned its "nothing to
negotiate" posture for a middle course." A quantitative restriction on
Hungarian imports was established, to be replaced later by a special tariff
arrangement.6 t
. Membership in the International Monetary Fund
Monetary and trade policy are intimately connected.62 In a planned
economy, the state determines monetary policy by decreeing who may
possess and convert foreign currency and at what exchange rate. Foreign
debt is totally national debt. By manipulating monetary policy, the state
in a planned economy enforces its trade decisions by determining who
may and may not purchase foreign products or incur foreign debt. 3
Because of the inherent differences concerning monetary policy in
planned and free market economies, the IMF has been unable to make
any direct improvements in trade relations between the two blocksf 4
However, the IMF's ability to ease harsh financial conditions of its mem-
bers by adjusting the repayment of debt and influencing the availability
and marketability of foreign currency indirectly affects trade by increas-
54 As required by article XXXIII, Hungary received the two-thirds majority vote and acceded
to the GATT in 1973. 31 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 318) 56 (1988) [hereinafter OPINION].
55 K. DAM, supra note 53, at 345.
56 GATT, supra note 45, art. XXXV; K. DAM, supra note 53, at 347.
57 M. M. KoSmciu, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM 91-98 (1978), reprinted in
J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 48, at 1184-87.
58 Id. The protocols governing Hungary's accession did contain such safeguard clauses. OPIN-
ION, supra note 54, at 131.
59 M. M. KOSTECKI, supra note 57.
60 Id.; OPINION, supra note 54.
61 OPINION, supra note 54.
62 J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 48, at 826.
63 See generally id. at 845-46.
64 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 24-25.
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ing the members' trade attractiveness.65 Hungary benefited from its IMF
membership during economic crises by IMF measures which reduced fi-
nancial pressure and created conditions which encouraged the flow of
private capital.66
C. Membership in the World Bank
The World Bank exists to "promote growth, trade and balance of
trade equilibrium of its members" by facilitating the investment of capi-
tal for productive purposes.67 Membership in the IMF is a prerequisite
to membership in the World Bank.68 In both organizations, Hungary is
classified as a "developing country. '69 Members designated as "develop-
ing countries" are able to obtain long-term financing from the World
Bank for specific projects and structural adjustment loans.70 As of 1986,
only two communist countries, Romania and Hungary, were members of
the World Bank.71 Thus, Hungary's World Bank membership makes it
an appealing negotiating party compared with other CMEA member
states.
As described above, Hungary is an especially attractive potential
CMEA trading partner for the EC because of its membership in the
GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. Hungary's accession to the
GATT involved important concessions not heretofore offered by a
planned economy. Hungary's membership in the IMF and the World
Bank as a "developing country" involves certain preferences which en-
courage the flow of private capital.
III. THE NEGOTIATIONS
Hungary's foreign trade surplus has been growing since the early
1980s. 72 Although the USSR is Hungary's main trading partner, 73 trade
with the EC accounts for almost 20% of Hungary's foreign trade.74 In
1986, Hungary proposed to increase trade with the EC by 10-20% over
65 Id.
66 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 25.
67 J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 48, at 279.
68 Id.
69 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 25.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 30. But note, this growth trend was arrested in 1986, and 1987 may show a reversal.
73 Trade with the USSR accounted for 32% of Hungary's foreign trade in 1986. Id. In 1988,
the USSR remained Hungary's biggest trading partner. Initialling of a Trade and Economic and
Trade Cooperation Agreement Between The Community and Hungary, Commission of The European
Communities Press Release, July 1, 1988.
74 WORKING Doc., supra note 3, at 30.
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the succeeding five years.7 5 The EC supplies Hungary with machinery,
vehicles, finished goods and chemical products; Hungary supplies agri-
cultural products and finished goods. 76
In June 1986, the EC Parliament passed a resolution establishing
objectives for a trade and economic cooperation agreement with Hun-
gary to guide the ongoing negotiations.77 The initial points included:
(a) the gradual raising of quantitative import restrictions according to
a specified timetable, taking into account the sectoral and regional
sensitivity of the individual products;
(b) a safeguard clause giving the Community's internal market ade-
quate protection in the event of changes in economic
circumstances;
(c) customs arrangements on a reciprocal basis for an agreed list of
commodities according to a timetable;
(d) in respect of agriculture, a new approach that takes account of
Hungary's need to export, whilst observing reciprocity and re-
specting the sectoral and regional sensitivity of individual Commu-
nity products; [and]
(e) the establishment of an EEC-Hungary joint committee instructed
to consider the further expansion of economic relations (e.g. in-
dustrial cooperation, joint ventures in transport, technology and
research for mutual benefit, and to draw up appropriate
proposals).78
The resolution also noted that in light of Hungary's special characteris-
tics, liberalization of trade with Hungary was not likely to serve as a
precedent for the EC's common commercial policy towards CMEA
countries.79
Subsequent to the resolution, the Commission 80 proposed an agree-
ment on trade in agricultural and industrial products."' That these
products are the major Hungarian exports to the EC may explain why
the EC's proposal included tariff concessions and the elimination of
quantitative import restrictions.8 2 The proposal further provided for bi-
lateral cooperation in the economic, scientific, and technological areas.8 3
No financial cooperation was proposed.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Resolution, supra note 39.
78 Id. at 193.
79 Id.
80 The Commission consists of 17 Commissioners of all 12 nationalities. The Commission pro-
poses laws for the Community, administers policies, and monitors compliance with treaties. THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 4, at 8.
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The first round of the EC-Hungary trade negotiations was held in
Brussels on June 4 and 5, 1987.84 Hungary was only the second Eastern
Bloc country to negotiate with the EC.85 The EC's Council of Minis-
ters 6 articulated three guidelines for the Commission during negotia-
tions with Hungary.87 The Commission was to: "grant Hungary MFN
status; liberalize the quantitative restrictions on industrial and agricul-
tural products; [and] conclude an economic, scientific and technological
cooperation agreement focusing on information exchange."88 The Coun-
cil also recognized factors which provided bargaining strength for Hun-
gary, such as Hungary's membership in the GATT, and the Council's
commitment to liberalizing trade.8 9
In the first round of negotiations, Hungary provided a list of prod-
ucts for which it desired import tariff quotas.90 These products included
wines, beef, pork, poultry, cheeses, honey and some vegetables.9" The
Council however, objected to this demand because it did not want to
open up EC members' borders favorably for agricultural products in
which the EC already had a large surplus. 92 Another point of contention
in the negotiations concerned quantitative restrictions on industrial
trade, which Hungary wanted eliminated. The Commission indicated
the Council of Ministers would only agree to a gradual decrease in these
restrictions.93 Further, the Council of Ministers had designated certain
"sensitive" products to which the EC would not commit, including
leather goods, footwear and steel products.94
Subsequent rounds of negotiations were unsuccessful due to the con-
flict over the level of quotas the EC would maintain on Hungarian ex-
ports. 95 Such quotas were viewed by Hungarian representatives as
conflicting with the GATT rules.96 Hungary wanted complete removal
84 Opening of EC-Hungary Negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement, EC Press Re-
lease, June 4, 1987.
85 Id. Negotiations with Romania were opened in May of 1987. Id.
86 Ministers from each member government are a part of the Council of Ministers. The minis-
ters present on the Council vary depending on the subject matter under discussion. The Council
makes final decisions on laws for the Community. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note I, at 8.
87 EEC/Hungary: Trade Agreement Negotiations Begin in Brussels, EC External Relations
Press Release, June 6, 1987.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 EEC/Hungary: First Round of Negotiations Goes Smoothly, EC External Relations Press










of the quotas for its exports, 97  but expressed a willingness to
compromise. 98
Concessions in the negotiations were critical to an agreement. The
Council of Ministers agreed to shorten the phase of quota restrictions for
Hungarian exports from 1998 to 1995.99 Hungary had wanted the target
date to be 19 92 ./°° When agreeing to reduce the time frame of the re-
strictions, the EC demanded a safeguard clause, protecting some Hun-
garian imports, to span from 1996 to 1998.10° Further, Hungary agreed
to improve access and business conditions to aid the EC exporters."0 2
Negotiations ended June 30, 1988 with the initialing of a mutually
satisfying agreement. 13 The EC Council approved the Agreement be-
tween the European Economic Community and the Hungarian People's
Republic on trade, commercial, and economic cooperation on November
21, 1988. The agreement, which is to be valid for 10 years,"° provides
that the restrictions EC members have applied with respect to Hungarian
imports will be eliminated in three stages by the end of 1995.10° The
agreement also provides for Hungary's application of nondiscriminatory
treatment toward the products, enterprises, and licenses of the EC.106
IV. EC-HUNGARY NEGOTIATIONS: A MODEL FOR AD Hoc
DISPUTE RESOLUTION?
The bilateral negotiations between the EC and Hungary resulted in
an agreement to the satisfaction of both parties on trade issues. How-
ever, the extent to which these negotiations will serve as a precedent in
East-West negotiations remains to be seen. In its earlier resolution, the
EC Parliament noted that the unique characteristics of Hungary kept the
97 EC Urged to Work HarderforAmbitious Accord with Hungary. Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 22,
1988.
98 Id. Cf Thatcher Pledges Backing for Hungarian Reforms, Reuter Libr. Rep., May 5, 1988.




102 Buchan, Outlook for EC-Hungary Accord Brightens, Financial Times, June 14, 1988.
103 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Hungarian People's Repub-
lic on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, 31 0. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) 1-34
(Nov. 30, 1988). The agreement covers trade and cooperation in agricultural and industrial prod-
ucts, but does not affect existing agreements in textiles and steel. Id. at art. 3.
104 Id. at art. 16.
105 Id. at art. 4. The three stages reflect the sensitivity of the products. The first stage abol-
ishes restrictions on non-sensitive products in the first year of the agreement. The second stage
abolishes restrictions on fairly sensitive products by the end of 1992, while the third stage provides
for abolition in very sensitive sectors by the end of 1995. These very sensitive products account for
about 20% of the restrictions and include textiles, fertilizers, wood products, glass and leather goods.
Id. at 1-2.
106 Id. at art. 10.
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actual results of negotiations from serving as precedent to concessions
with other countries.10 7 It is thus difficult to predict if other CMEA
members may follow Hungary's lead.
The EC articulated several reasons why it prefers to proceed with
each CMEA member state on a bilateral basis. First, the EC wants to
finesse the USSR's dominant power in the CMEA.° 8 Second, through
bilateral agreements, countries' individual characteristics can be taken
into account.'0 9
It is not as clear why the EC did not proceed in establishing its
relations with Hungary through the structure of the GATT. The bilat-
eral approach may signal that the EC views the GATT as too ponderous.
Alternately, it may indicate that the EC views the GATT as a mecha-
nism too weak to support a satisfactory agreement.
Regardless of the motive, by continuing on the course of bilateral
negotiations outside the structural context of the GATT, the EC may
weaken the GATT. After viewing the EC's bilateral successes, other
countries may follow suit and similarly by pass the GATT framework
and negotiate bilaterally. This may result in a stronger EC at the ex-
pense of the GATT.
107 Resolution, supra note 39, at 193.
108 Speech, supra note 2, at 8; Trevelyan, supra note 15.
109 Memo, supra note 2, at 2.
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